Theories of Emotion and Their Relationship to Cognition: An Analysis from the Philosophy of Mind
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Abstract
This paper addresses the discussion concerning the characterization of emotions sustained by the so-called “cognitive current” and “perceptual current.” These have canonically been conceived as incompatible ways of accounting for the same phenomenon: basic emotions.
In this paper, I aim to examine the disagreement between these opposing approaches, seeking to specify the scope of that disagreement and to elucidate the key concepts on which the discussion is built.
The article is structured as follows. First, each of the positions in question is presented. To this end, proposals from both philosophy and psychology are considered: those of R. Solomon and R. Lazarus, from the cognitive perspective, and those of W. James and R. Zajonc, from the perceptual perspective.
In this section, “The Approaches in Dispute,” I seek to offer a conceptual reconstruction of each position, establishing their fundamental theses. These theses are then examined in depth in the following section, “Cognition and Perception,” with the aim of showing that the disagreement itself, and the difficulties that emerge from it in providing an adequate characterization of the phenomenon, can be overcome or, at least, must be reconceptualized.
In this sense, I offer two ways in which such reconceptualization may take place. First, in a dissolutory sense, by showing that the discrepancy between the two perspectives is founded on false dichotomies, thereby turning the discussion into a terminological disagreement. Second, I outline a mode of resolution in the proper sense through the consideration of dual approaches, in the section “The Meaning of ‘Emotion’: Are There Unconscious Emotions?”
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