Metaethical Interpretations of Hume’s Work
Main Article Content
Abstract
One of the reasons why Hume’s name is currently cited in ethical-philosophical contexts is his notable influence on contemporary metaethics through various remarks and arguments. However, his own view of moral language and practical argumentation remains a matter of debate.
This paper aims to elucidate the metaethical position held by the Scottish philosopher. After presenting the most important interpretations on the issue—the individual-subjectivist, the emotivist, and the naturalist-objectivist interpretations—and recalling the main passages in Hume’s work on which their respective readings are based, some limits to the emotivist interpretation of Hume will be shown. It will then be argued that the Scottish philosopher sustained a naturalistic position on moral language.
Downloads
Article Details

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 4.0 International License.
The author/s grant exclusive license without temporary limit for the manuscript to be published in Cuadernos-FHyCS edited by Humanides the Faculty of Social Science, National University of Jujuy.
References
Ayer, A. J. (1971) Lenguaje, verdad y lógica. (Trad. R. Resta). Buenos Aires, Eudeba.
Ayer, A. J. (1980) Hume. Oxford, Oxford University Press.
Benn, S. I. y Peters, R. S. (1959) Social Principles and the Democratic State. Londres, Allen & Unwin.
Espinoza, F. (2005) Una lectura habermasiana de la teoría moral de Hume. En: G. López Sastre (Comp.), David Hume: nuevas perspectivas sobre su obra. Cuenca, Ediciones de la Universidad de Castilla-La Mancha, pp. 89-106.
Flew, A. (1963) On the interpretation of Hume. Philosophy, 38, (144), pp. 178-181. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
Harman, G. y Thomson, J. J. (1996) Moral Relativism and Moral Objectivity. Oxford, Blackwell Publishers.
Hume, D. (1984) Tratado de la naturaleza humana (3 tomos). (Trad. F. Duque). Buenos Aires, Hyspamérica.
Hume, D. (1991) Investigación sobre los principios de la moral. (Trad. G. López Sastre). Madrid, Espasa-Calpe.
Joyce, R. (2009) Expressivism, motivation internalism, and Hume. En: C. R. Pigden (Ed.), Hume on Motivation: New Essays. Londres, Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 30-56.
Pigden, C. R. (2009) If not non-cognitivism, then what? En: C. R. Pigden (Ed.), Hume on Motivation: New Essays. Londres, Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 80-104.
Price, H. (1988) Facts and the Function of Truth. Oxford, Blackwell.
Smith, M. (1994) The Moral Problem. Oxford, Blackwell Publishers.
Snare, F. (1991) Morals, Motivation, and Convention: Hume's Influential Approach to Ethics. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.