REDUCTION AS AN EXAMPLE OF INTERTHEORICAL RELATION
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Abstract
In this paper we will analyze intertheoretical relations problem by focusing on the reduction in order to see whether or not this has been overcome. This will begin with historical account of the subject, mainly the Vienna Circle and the logical empiricism. Then we will show some critics against the received view’s idea of reduction, chiefly the historicist turn. After we will analyze the vision of Ulises Moulines (1991), representative of the structuralist view, which advocates the reduction as one of different kind of possible types of intertheorical relationships and offers an account of it, according to hem, that avoid historicist criticism grounded in the meanings variations in theoretical change. Finally we will evaluate whether this last position overcame the received view.
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