The Limits of Semantic Content in Psychological States
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Abstract
This paper addresses a classical problem in cognitive psychology: the problem of individuation. It shows the difficulties involved in reconciling methodological individualism with individuation by virtue of intentional properties. On the one hand, it evaluates the constraints of individualism; on the other, it examines the scope of semantic content for the individuation of mental states. Finally, it considers Fodor’s non-reductionist strategy for the “special” sciences.
The paper concludes that, in principle, there do not seem to be any objections to the individuation of mental states by virtue of intentional properties.
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This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 4.0 International License.
The author/s grant exclusive license without temporary limit for the manuscript to be published in Cuadernos-FHyCS edited by Humanides the Faculty of Social Science, National University of Jujuy.
References
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