Reduction as an Example of an Intertheoretical Relationship
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Abstract
Scientific theories are in constant relation to one another. For example, it is not possible to empirically test a theory without presupposing others, nor is it possible to introduce a new one unless it is compatible with the knowledge accepted up to that point. A classic way of analyzing the problem of intertheoretical relations has been the reductionist model.
In this paper, we will analyze the problem of intertheoretical relations, focusing on reduction in order to determine whether or not it has been overcome. To this end, we will begin with a historical review of how the received view addressed the issue, mainly through the Vienna Circle and logical empiricism. We will then present some of the main criticisms of this treatment, focusing on those formulated in the context of the historicist turn.
Afterward, we will analyze the view of Ulises Moulines (1991), a representative of the structuralist conception, who defends reduction as one of the different possible types of intertheoretical relations and offers a version that, according to him, is immune to historicist criticisms concerning the variation of meanings in theoretical change.
Finally, we will evaluate whether this position implies an overcoming of the received view.
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