Reinstatement, Defeat, and Deactivation: A Discussion of Argument Acceptability
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Abstract
Reinstatement is a principle in argumentation systems according to which a defeated argument may count as justified provided that its defeaters are themselves defeated. For this purpose, it is not considered relevant to distinguish among types of defeat: all are regarded as equivalent and adequate. In this paper, that idea is questioned.
This questioning immediately leads to the following question: how should reinstatement be redefined? To answer it, a methodology commonly used in the field will be followed. First, a series of examples will be presented: some that conform to the standard notion of reinstatement, that is, well-behaved examples, and others in which unexpected results are obtained and which call its validity into question. Both types of examples are then compared, similarities and differences are highlighted, possible causes of these differences are analyzed, and a way of interpreting the results is proposed.
As a result, it is found that in the well-behaved examples there is a type of defeat that is absent in those that do not behave in this way. Specifically, this type of defeat is characterized by the fact that accepting the defeater leads one to believe that the defeated argument is supported by some false, incorrect, or implausible assumption. This special type of defeat will be called deactivation.
The new meaning of reinstatement proposed here is therefore the following: an argument, despite having been defeated by another, may be considered justified provided that its defeaters are deactivated.
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